No Man Is An Island… But Putin wants to be
How the Russian president became so isolated and why negotiating an end to the war in Ukraine will be near impossible
Vladimir Putin has been at the helm of power in Russia, either as President or Prime Minister, for more than two decades.
In that time he has cultivated an authoritarian regime in which legitimate opponents are persecuted and elections are convened only to highlight the absence of political alternatives.
But for much of his reign the man was seen as a keen, accomplished communicator intent on building and maintaining relations abroad.
Putin was renowned for his willingness to discuss policy, both domestic and foreign and was widely praised for his ability to intellectually spar with conversational adversaries. He was also recognised, at least during his first two terms as president from 1999 – 2008, for opening up Russia’s economy to Western investors and seeking to establish good diplomatic ties with Western powers.
Until this year, Putin held an annual ‘Direct Line’ event – a marathon Q&A session which saw him deliver lengthy answers to questions submitted by ordinary Russian citizens in the absence of notes or a teleprompter. He even penned an op-ed in 2013 which was published in The New York Times.
Nine years on, things have changed dramatically - I for one don’t see Putin getting a thought piece published in one of America’s largest newspapers any time soon.
Russia’s leader has become isolationist and one-dimensional in his thinking. He makes sweeping decisions with little to no input from the Kremlin’s elites, and since ordering troops across the Ukrainian border has seemingly assumed the role of a modern-day tsar responsible for rebuilding the Russian empire.
But how did this come to be?
Here, World Beyond The West takes a look at the factors which led Putin to cut himself off from the rest of the world in his pursuit of Ukraine – and why the chances of successfully negotiating a peaceful end to the war with the Russian autocrat are slim to none.
Obsession with Russian history, nationalism and the concept of the Russian World
Putin’s disdain for the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 is no secret. He once famously referred to its collapse as ‘the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century’.
But the Russian president is also a keen student of history and is reported to be an avid reader of a particular set of Russian nationalist writers. His rhetoric is seemingly heavily influenced by the likes of Ivan Ilyin and Alexander Dugin – political philosophers who expounded on the necessity for Russia to break free of the influence of Western liberalism and consolidate a traditional, authoritarian state reinforced by a strict adherence to Christianity.
Putin has made countless references to the concept of the русский мир, or ‘Russian World’ during his time in power, particularly since returning to the presidency in 2012.
According to the eponymous state cultural foundation, founded by Putin himself in 2007, the Russian World ‘includes not only Russians, not only inhabitants of Russia, not only our fellow countrymen in foreign countries near and far, emigrants, expatriates, and their descendants. It also extends to foreign citizens who speak, learn, and teach Russian and all people with a sincere interest in Russia and her future.’
And it is the state’s job to promote it.
In theory, a nation’s desire to safeguard and celebrate its language and culture is a wholly positive notion – an endeavour that ought not be begrudged. But the concept of the Russian World – at least in Putin’s mind, goes far beyond that.
Practically – at least for Putin - establishing the Russian World seems to equate to an imperialist expansion of Russian territory and influence, preventing the tide of Western liberal philosophy from rippling eastwards.
In effect, he wants to restore the great empire of old, unifying a Russian-speaking tripartite – Russia, Ukraine and Belarus – as well as other territories including parts of Kazakhstan, Moldova and Georgia into a superstate linked by language, culture and Russian Orthodox Christianity, impervious to the pull of the West.
(Don’t take my word for it – you can read Putin’s 5,000 word essay published just last year on why Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are all one people, a ‘single whole… bound together by one language, economic ties and the Orthodox faith’)
The Russo-Georgian war of 2008 was the first step towards rebuilding the Russian World and occurred while Putin was serving as Russia’s Prime Minister under Dmitry Medvedev.
Russia effectively baited Georgia into a conflict with separatist forces in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which gave Moscow the green light to crush Georgian troops and resulted in the Kremlin formally recognising both territories as independent.
This set the precedent for Putin’s annexation of Crimea and support for separatist movements in eastern Ukraine in 2014, and eight years later, the invasion proper of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.
It is one thing to negotiate a peace or compromise with a man driven by greed or material gain. A man driven by deep-rooted principles and a profound belief in a greater ideal is another thing entirely.
Mistrust of The United States and NATO expansion
Putin grew up in the Soviet Union, rose through the ranks of the KGB during the height of the Cold War and was trained in the art of secret keeping, subversion and kompromat.
Given the trajectory of his upbringing and early career, it’s hardly surprising that we haven’t seen Putin strutting about the Red Square dressed like Big Sam and crooning The Star-Spangled Banner.
But in the early days of his presidency there were high points in Moscow’s relationship with the US.
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001, Putin and then US President George W. Bush spoke of ‘a new relationship for the 21st century, founded on a commitment to the values of democracy, the free market, and the rule of law’, which at the time was lauded as a major milestone for post-Cold War bilateral relations.
The relationship got off to a good start, too.
Less than a year after 9/11, Putin and Bush pledged to form a united front against terror while US and Russian energy bosses convened for a joint summit in Houston to identify barriers preventing investment and develop new business partnerships.
There was even the creation of the NATO-Russia council, which aimed to facilitate Moscow’s interactions with the security bloc and help the parties work together on nuclear non-proliferation and military co-operation.
Yet despite this promise, the relationship turned sour as the US set about demonstrating its apparent lack of understanding, or perhaps plain disregard, for Russia’s security concerns and distaste for what the Kremlin saw as its penchant for regime change and imposition of democracy.
America’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a source of great alarm for Putin. He saw a domineering White House intent on flexing its military muscles and unjustly interfering in the domestic affairs of a foreign nation, describing the invasion as a ‘big mistake’.
The US support for the so-called colour revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan which followed in 2003-2005 only served to crystallise Putin’s view of America as a dominant threat, and one which sought to destabilise the post-Soviet landscape along Russia’s borders for its own political gain.
By 2008, bilateral relations between the Kremlin and the White House were in tatters. The final straw was Bush’s open declaration on April 1 that he ‘strongly supported’ the notion of Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO.
Putin detested America’s interventionist approach to the affairs of post-Soviet states and what he saw as its insistence that NATO could be the only stable, legitimate security bloc in Eurasia.
Though tensions cooled somewhat during the interlude in Putin’s presidential terms when Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama ascended to the presidency, the Kremlin’s fear that it would become encircled by a powerful military conglomerate of which it was not a part never dissipated.
COVID-19
Though Russia has not imposed a ruthless ‘zero-Covid’ policy like that of China’s President Xi Jinping on its citizens, Putin has been extremely cautious in his personal approach to the pandemic.
He has for the most part locked himself away in any one of his sprawling personal residences and anyone who wants to see him is subject to constant testing and quarantines prior to meeting.
When he has stepped into the same room with other individuals, particularly foreign leaders, he has gone to great lengths – literally – to remain distanced, often via a giant table which serves a symbolic purpose as much as a physical one.
Now at age 70 and with speculation mounting over his declining health, the Russian president has seemingly doubled down and is scarcely seen in public.
Fiona Hill, a former presidential advisor on Russia in the Bush, Obama and Trump administrations, concluded that Putin’s enduring isolation likely hardened his views, made it more difficult for his entourage to deliver a wide breadth of intelligence to him, and suggested the Russian president could well be ‘seeking and gathering information himself which fits into his worldview and framework’.
Such self-imposed seclusion can only exacerbate the rigidity in Putin’s thinking, eliminating what little chance he had of hearing opinions that challenge his own and those shared by his ideologues and yes men.
Long gone are the days of old when Reagan and Gorbachev sat across from each other and hashed out their roadmap out of the Cold War.
Neither Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, nor US President Biden, will be pulling up a chair beside Vladimir in the near future, and any attempts to negotiate will almost certainly only take place through a series of intermediaries.
What all this means, then, is that likelihood of a peaceful end to the conflict achieved through diplomacy in the coming months is effectively nil.
Of course, not all wars end with the total devastation and unconditional surrender of one side or another.
But a Center for Strategic and International Studies analysis of conflict resolution data since World War II found that only 24 per cent of interstate wars like Ukraine that lasted between one month and one year end in a negotiated ceasefire.
Wars that extend longer than a year typically drag out for more than a decade, devolving into a stalemate with continued sporadic clashes where talks fail to achieve lasting peace.
Putin’s so-called ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine is well into its ninth month, and with no signs of a ceasefire on the horizon I fear the Russian president will continue to wage war for a long time to come.
This is a really good read and I appreciate the insight.
I do agree with your viewpoint on Russia, but you're absolutely taking sides despite your statement in your about section. I'm not against that, it's your country, and I know less than you. But why not be frank about giving your perspective? I prefer non bias but your alternative just means more focus...
Really interesting read, David. Keep 'em coming!